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Prior research finds an individual’s end of year tax position is framed by expectations 
(e.g., prior year tax position) and withholding position (i.e., refund vs additional taxes 
due), and suggests individuals concurrently maintain and are influenced by multiple 
reference points. In this study, I examine a theoretical explanation for how multiple 
reference points can influence an individual’s decisions even though the shape of the 
prospect theory value function is based on a single reference point. Specifically, I predict 
expectations influence decisions through a risky choice framing effect which is caused by 
diminishing sensitivity in the prospect theory value function while withholding position 
influences decisions through a goal framing effect which is caused by loss aversion. 
Moreover, I predict these two framing effects will interact. While I do not find the 
predicted interaction, experimental results are consistent with my hypotheses regarding 
the mechanisms underlying the two framing effects, and provide evidence about how 
multiple reference points can concurrently influence decisions. The results also suggest 
researchers who use prospect theory should specifically identify whether a hypothesized 
effect is driven by loss aversion or diminishing sensitivity as the value function could 
potentially provide multiple alternative explanations for a hypothesized effect.
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Prior research in a wide range of disciplines relies on prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) to derive hypotheses about individual 
decision making. Moreover, a plethora of research specifically focuses on the 
implications of the prospect theory value function to examine accounting topics such as 
earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), financial disclosures (Dietrich et 
al. 2001), relative performance information (Eyring and Narayanan 2018), and – 
especially relevant to this study – taxpayer decision making (Yaniv 1999; Dhami and Al-
Nowaihi 2007; Falsetta et al. 2013; Austin, Bobek, and LaMothe 2019). In making their 
predictions, researchers rely on the shape of the value function, which is derived from 
two distinct features: diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). However, Keren (2011) suggests most researchers overlook the fact that the shape 
of the prospect theory value function results from these two separate features. As a result, 
many studies potentially use prospect theory as a theoretical “black box” by referencing 
the value function without actually explaining which feature is the theoretical mechanism 
underlying their hypotheses. In this study, I use an experiment set in the context of a risky 
tax decision to highlight the importance of distinguishing between diminishing sensitivity 
and loss aversion in the prospect theory value function by showing how each of these two 
features can separately and concurrently influence decision making.  
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In the literature on individual taxpayers, the prospect theory value function has 
primarily been used to explain tax compliance decisions with a particular interest on how 
reference points frame tax compliance decisions (Loftus 1985; Smith and Kinsey 1987; 
Carroll 1987). This literature finds loss frames lead individuals to be less compliant than 
gain frames (Schepanski and Kelsey 1990; Feltham and Paquette 2002; Jackson and 
Hatfield 2005). However, the literature is divided over what reference point actually 
frames tax compliance decisions. Most studies suggest current asset position, or 
withholding position (i.e., whether an individual is due a tax refund or owes additional 
taxes), frames tax compliance decisions. Based on this reference point, individuals who 
are due a refund (i.e., an increase to currently held assets) are in a gain frame while those 
who owe additional taxes (i.e. a decrease in currently held assets) are in a loss frame 
(Chang and Schultz 1990; Schepanski and Shearer 1995; Jackson and Hatfield 2005; 
Brink and Lee 2015). Other research instead suggests expected asset position, or 
expectations (e.g., prior year refund/due, estimates by tax preparer, etc.), is the reference 
point that frames tax compliance decisions (Schadewald 1989; Kirchler and Maciejovsky 
2001). Based on this reference point, individuals who are due a smaller refund or owe 
more taxes than expected are in a loss frame while those who are due a larger refund or 
owe less taxes than expected are in a gain frame. However, in an experiment which 
manipulates both reference points, Schepanski and Shearer (1995) only find evidence for 
the effect of withholding position. 
In an attempt to improve upon past research, Copeland and Cuccia (2002) 
examine both reference points in an experiment where each participant’s expectations are 
estimated based on actual tax filings from the previous three years. Participants are then 
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randomly assigned a tax refund or due that is either 50 percent higher or lower than the 
estimated expectation. As refund or tax due is based on an increase or decrease to each 
participant’s estimated expectations, withholding position is a measured, rather than 
manipulated, variable. Results from their experiment indicate withholding position and 
expectations both influence tax compliance decisions. While Copeland and Cuccia (2002) 
provide support for the idea, they do not examine the theoretical mechanisms which 
could allow multiple reference points to concurrently influence an individual’s decisions. 
For example, Copeland and Cuccia (2002, 519) suggest “future research might examine 
whether [withholding position and expectations] act as independent referents or are 
somehow combined to form a single composite referent.” Moreover, the authors did not 
randomly assign expectations – only changes relative to estimated expectations – and 
therefore did not control for the effect of participants’ innate expectations (e.g., 
entitlement - individuals who receive larger refunds may feel entitled to a large refund 
and therefore claim more advantageous tax treatments). Similarly, Copeland and Cuccia 
(2002) were unable to randomly assign withholding position and therefore may have 
detected differences between individuals who typically owe additional taxes and those 
who typically receive a refund. Accordingly, I re-examine the notion of multiple framing 
effects in the individual tax compliance setting with a focus on providing an explanation 
for how multiple reference points can concurrently frame a situation at the same time.  
Based on a popular typology of framing effects by Levin et al. (1998), I predict 
risky decisions can concurrently involve two distinct framing effects that rely on different 
features of the prospect theory value function. In the tax setting, I predict withholding 
positions can frame end of year tax decisions through a process known as goal framing, 
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which is theoretically driven by loss aversion. In contrast, I predict expectations can 
frame the end of year tax decisions through a process known as risky choice framing, 
which is theoretically driven by diminishing sensitivity. In addition, I also examine 
whether these two framing effects can interact with each other. Based on theory related to 
reference point adaptation (Arkes et al. 2008), I hypothesize these two framing effects 
will interact such that expectations will influence decisions to a greater extent in the 
context of receiving a tax refund than in the context of owing additional taxes. 
To test my predictions, I conduct a 2x2 between-participants experiment in which 
real taxpayers solicited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) make a decision about 
taking a risky tax deduction. To manipulate withholding position, participants are 
informed they are either due a tax refund (i.e., gain frame) or owe additional taxes (i.e., 
loss frame) as they finalize their return. To manipulate expectations, participants are 
informed they either overestimated or underestimated the amount of the risky deduction. 
As deductions serve to reduce tax liability, participants in the underestimated condition 
are led to initially expect a relatively small tax refund or a large tax due and then face a 
choice between options which will make them better off (i.e., a gain frame) by increasing 
their refund or decreasing their tax due. Participants in the overestimated condition, in 
contrast, are led to initially expect a relatively large tax refund or a small tax due and face 
a choice between options which will make them worse off (i.e., a loss frame) by 
decreasing their refund or increasing their tax due. The dependent variable is the 
preference for taking a risky tax deduction, and is measured using a 10-point Likert-type 
scale. Importantly, I also collect measures of loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, 
using an approach adapted from Holt and Laury (2002), to provide evidence of the 
5 
theoretical mechanism driving withholding framing (i.e., a goal framing effect which is 
caused by loss aversion) and expectations framing (i.e., a risky choice framing which is 
caused by diminishing sensitivity).  
Results from the experiment provide initial evidence largely consistent with the 
hypotheses, and suggest the two framing effects are the result of separate features of the 
prospect theory value function. Specifically, the results suggest withholding position 
influences decisions through a goal framing effect which is most (least) prominent when 
an individual’s value function exhibits a high (low) level of loss aversion, and is 
unaffected by the extent of diminishing sensitivity present in an individual’s value 
function. In contrast, the results suggest expectations frame decisions through a risky 
choice framing effect which is most (least) prominent when an individual’s value 
function exhibits a high (low) level of diminishing sensitivity, and is unaffected by the 
extent of loss aversion present in an individual’s value function. The results also confirm 
and extend the findings of Copeland and Cuccia (2002) by providing stronger evidence of 
multiple concurrent framing effects and theoretical support for the mechanisms which 
allow both frames to simultaneously influence tax compliance decisions. However, I find 
no evidence of an interaction between the two framing effects. 
This study makes multiple important contributions. First, the results contribute to 
the literature on individual taxpayer decisions. Prior research has been divided as to 
whether end of year tax compliance decisions are framed by prepayment position, 
expectations, or both. This study contributes by providing a more controlled test of the 
concurrent influence of multiple reference points and provides evidence as to how 
multiple reference points and framing effects simultaneously influence the decision 
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making processes of individual. Moreover, this study helps to resolve past disagreements 
regarding the theoretical mechanism underlying withholding position framing effects. 
While some studies inherently focus on loss aversion (Carroll 1987; Jackson and Hatfield 
2005), others either focus on diminishing sensitivity and risk preferences (Loftus 1985; 
Elffers et al. 1987), or do not distinguish between the two (e.g., Robben et al. 1990; 
Casey and Scholz 1991). Results from my study suggest withholding position framing 
effects are driven by loss aversion and are not driven by diminishing sensitivity.  
Second, this study contributes pragmatically to the policy makers and tax 
enforcement agencies. The results related to expectations framing suggest different types 
of taxpayers may be more or less compliant on their tax return. For example, individuals 
who work multiple jobs may be more likely to be noncompliant when filing their tax 
return as taxes due on wages from a second job are typically under withheld. 
Accordingly, wages from a second job usually increase taxes owed or decrease a refund 
due (i.e., create a loss risky choice frame). In addition, the results also suggest individuals 
may be more likely to understate income than to overstate a deduction or credit because 
reporting additional income has the effect of increasing their tax liability (i.e., a loss risky 
choice frame) while deductions and credits have the effect of reducing their tax liability 
(i.e., a gain risky choice frame). Moreover, identifying the mechanisms underlying 
different framing effects contributes pragmatically by providing guidance to enforcement 
agencies as to the best ways to reduce noncompliance. 
Finally, the results also contribute theoretically to the literatures on framing 
effects and prospect theory. While researchers have widely adopted the typology of 
framing effects provided by Levin et al. (1998), more recent research has questioned 
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whether risky choice and goal framing effects are in fact distinct phenomenon. For 
example, Keren (2011, 8) argues it is “questionable whether risky choice and goal 
framing are fundamentally different.” Accordingly, this study contributes to the literature 
which relies on the Levin et al. (1998) typology as it is the first study to my knowledge 
which empirically verifies that risky choice and goal framing effects result from distinct 
theoretical mechanisms. This study also contributes to the literature which relies on the 
prospect theory value function by highlighting the importance of distinguishing between 
diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. In the past, researchers have sometimes failed 
to realize that the shape of the prospect theory value function results from the 
combination of these two features (Keren 2011). While diminishing sensitivity and loss 
aversion frequently lead to similar predictions (e.g., more tax aggressiveness for end of 
year tax positions framed as losses either by withholding position or expectations), this is 
not always the case. Moreover, when diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion lead to 
similar predictions, researchers should seek to identify which mechanism gives rise to the 
hypothesized effect and rule out the other as an alternative explanation to help ensure 
readers understand why an effect occurs.  
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses background 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the experiment used to test 




BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Background 
Prospect theory – which was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
and later refined to incorporate cumulative representations of risk and uncertainty by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) – is a complex theory about decision making under risk, 
and consists of two parts: a subjective value function and a decision weighting function. 
Since conceived, prospect theory has been relied on extensively across multiple 
disciplines to derive various hypotheses (Barberis 2013). For example, researchers have 
widely adopted prospect theory as a theoretical explanation for framing effects (Chang et 
al. 2002).1 Starting with Jackson and Jones (1985), prospect theory has also been used 
extensively to examine risky tax decision making.2 While Jackson and Jones (1985) rely 
                                                          
1The word “framing” has grown over the last several decades to encompass a wide variety of phenomena. 
Perhaps the most frequently examined, valence framing effects involve situations or decisions which can be 
framed in positive or negative terms (i.e., gains and losses). In addition to valence framing effects, other 
research has expanded framing effects into situations which do not necessarily involve gains and losses. 
For example, emphasis framing (Druckman 2004) involves highlighting different subsets of potentially 
relevant considerations (e.g., one politician may describe a social welfare policy as an attempt to fight 
poverty and another could describe it as a burden on the middle class). Similarly, choice bracketing (Read 
et al. 1999) involves viewing choices in a narrower or broader context of multiple choices (e.g., a smoking 
habit can be described as one pack a day or 7,300 cigarettes in a year). However, the focus of this study is 
valence framing effects, and references to “framing” or “framing effects” beyond this point in the 
manuscript refer specifically to valence framing effects. 
2 Most of this literature has focused on tax evasion, which includes an ethical dimension (Alm and Torgler 
2011). However, not all studies focus on decisions involving ethical considerations. For example, 
Schadewald (1989) and Dusenbury (1994) use experimental settings involving ambiguity about the most 
appropriate treatment of a given tax item. Moreover, archival work in this area (e.g., Chang and Schultz 
1990; Christian 1994; Engström et al. 2015; Rees-Jones 2018) does not necessarily distinguish between 
evasion and aggressive underreporting of tax liability. In this study, I focus on risky tax decisions rather 
than tax evasion as my primary focus is on the operation of prospect theory, and recent research suggests 
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on both the value function and the decision weighting function to examine the relative 
importance of evasion penalties and risk of detection, subsequent research in the 
individual taxpayer setting has primarily focused on drawing inferences based on the 
value function (Loftus 1985; Smith and Kinsey 1987; Carroll 1987).  
The purpose of the value function is to translate outcomes into subjective values 
(i.e., utility), and is characterized by three central features: 1) reference dependency, 2) 
diminishing sensitivity, and 3) loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992). Reference dependency reflects the tendency of individuals to evaluate 
value relative to a neutral reference point which divides the value function into gain and 
loss domains (i.e., individuals tend to evaluate changes in, rather than the absolute level 
of, their current state). Diminishing sensitivity reflects the fact that a given change in the 
size of a gain or a loss has a smaller impact on subjective value as the distance from the 
reference point increases. For example, increasing a gain from $100 to $200 generates a 
larger increase in subjective value than increasing a gain from $1,100 to $1,200 (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1986). Diminishing sensitivity creates a concave shape in the gain domain 
and a convex shape in the loss domain, giving rise to the iconic S-shape of the value 
function. Loss aversion refers to the tendency of individuals to have a heightened 
response to losses as compared to gains. For example, most individuals will not accept a 
fair bet with an equal chance of winning and losing $100 (Kahneman et al. 1991). As 
“losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 279), the value function is 
steeper in the loss domain than in the gain domain. Importantly, as illustrated in Figure 
                                                          
the predictions of prospect theory are indirectly linked to behavior when risky decisions involve ethical 
considerations (Austin, Bobek, and Jackson 2019). 
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2.1, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion collectively gives rise to the shape of the 
value function. 
In the literature on individual taxpayer behavior, the prospect theory value 
function has been primarily used to explain how reference points frame end of year tax 
compliance decisions. The literature generally indicates individuals are more aggressive 
on their tax returns when faced with situations involving losses rather than situations 
involving gains (Schepanski and Kelsey 1990; Robben, Webley, Elffers, et al. 1990; 
Robben, Webley, Weigel, et al. 1990; Feltham and Paquette 2002). However, the 
literature has been divided as to whether withholding position (i.e., whether they are due 
a refund or owe additional taxes) or expectations about their end of year position (e.g., 
prior year tax position, an estimate provided by a tax preparer) serves as the reference 
point from which end of year tax compliance decisions are framed (Schadewald 1989). 
Interestingly, these possible reference points have not always been treated as distinct. For 
example, Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) do not disentangle withholding position from 
expectations (i.e., participants either face a refund or an amount due that is greater than 
they were led to expect). However, subsequent studies have more clearly distinguished 
between these possible reference points, and have either used one or the other (e.g., Brink 
and Lee 2015). 
Withholding position, sometimes called the current asset position, implies 
individuals use their level of wealth immediately prior to preparing a tax return as the 
reference point from which they evaluate their end of year tax position (Schepanski and 
Shearer 1995). From this reference point, any refund is an increase in wealth and will be 
perceived as a gain while any additional tax due is a decrease in wealth and will be 
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perceived as a loss (Yaniv 1999). Accordingly, any given amount of tax liability can be 
framed as a gain or a loss depending on whether interim tax withholdings are greater or 
less than the tax liability.3 Though not initially attributed to prospect theory, Clotfelter 
(1983) was the first to document evidence of a difference in behavior between taxpayers 
who are due a refund and who owe additional tax. In the years that followed, the 
influence of withholding position on risky tax decisions has been extensively validated 
experimentally (White et al. 1993; Jackson and Hatfield 2005; Brink and Lee 2015), 
archivally (Chang and Schultz 1990; Christian 1994; Engström et al. 2015; Rees-Jones 
2018), and analytically (Yaniv 1999; Dhami and Al-Nowaihi 2007; Rees-Jones 2018). 
Expectations, sometimes called the expected asset position, imply individuals 
develop an expectation about their end of year tax position, perhaps through experience 
or based on advice from a tax professional, and use this expectation as a reference point 
(Schadewald 1989). As a reference point for framing end of year tax positions, 
expectations have received much less attention and support than withholding position. 
For example, Schepanski and Shearer (1995) experimentally compared expectations with 
withholding position and found withholding position better represented the reference 
                                                          
3 Framing effects based on withholding position are frequently referred to as “the withholding 
phenomenon.” Most research on the withholding phenomenon suggests it is a type of framing effect (e.g., 
Loftus 1985; Smith and Kinsey 1987). However, more recently studies (e.g., Jackson and Hatfield 2005; 
Brink and Lee 2015) suggest the withholding phenomenon may be more accurately described as a domain 
effect or a reflection effect. The distinction between framing effects and domain or reflection effects is 
minor, but important. Framing effects involve describing the same choice in such a way that it is 
differentially perceived as being in the gain or loss domain even though the actual domain of the choice 
does not change (Fagley 1993). For example, the two different versions of the “Asian disease problem” 
both deal with loss the domain (i.e., lives lost) rather than the gain domain (i.e. lives created). In contrast, 
reflection or domain effects do not involve the “same gamble,” but rather one with gain prospects and one 
with loss prospects (Arkes 1991). Refunds and additional tax payments only exist as offsets of past 
overpayments or underpayments, respectively, and have no actual effect on tax liability or whether an 
aggressive tax position increases or decreases tax liability/wealth. Accordingly, I follow the perspective of 
the majority of research on the topic and view the withholding phenomenon as a framing effect. 
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point taxpayers used to evaluate their tax positions. Moreover, other research suggests 
expectations are only used as a reference point by certain groups of individuals or in a 
few select situations (Schadewald 1989; Kirchler and Maciejovsky 2001).  
Noting that experimentally assigned expectations may not be particularly salient, 
Copeland and Cuccia (2002) examine whether expectations based on an individual’s 
actual past tax returns and/or withholding position serve as reference points. Specifically, 
Copeland and Cuccia (2002) collect each participant’s prior year tax returns and use these 
returns along with solicited expectations from a holdout sample to create a model to 
estimate each participant’s expectations. Participants are then randomly assign to receive 
a tax refund/due which is either 50 percent higher or lower than the estimated 
expectations and are then asked to indicate their preference for a risky tax position (the 
actual decision depended on each participant’s tax situation). Using this approach, the 
authors find expectations and withholding position jointly frame an individual’s tax 
compliance choices. However, as the end of year tax position presented to participants 
was based on an adjustment to each participant’s previous tax filings, Copeland and 
Cuccia (2002) were unable to randomly assign withholding position or expectations. 
Moreover, while Copeland and Cuccia (2002) examine the role of additional adaptation 
time, they do not provide a theoretical explanation for how the prospect theory value 
function (the shape of which is premised on the existence of a single reference point) can 
account for the effect of multiple reference points.4 
                                                          
4 While the current study also examines the role of withholding position and expectations, it differs 
significantly from Copeland and Cuccia (2002). From an overarching perspective, the current study 
examines framing effects by using contextual features to manipulate the reference point from which 
participants evaluate their decision while Copeland and Cuccia (2002) examine domain effects by 
manipulating actual outcomes relative to the reference points participants bring to the study (see footnote 
3). Moreover, the authors do not investigate the mechanisms which allow multiple reference point to 
influence the same decision at the same time. Copeland and Cuccia (2002) due provide initial evidence in 
13 
Reference Points and Frames 
Based on a typology of framing effects by Levin et al. (1998), I propose and 
examine an explanation for how the prospect theory value function can account for the 
simultaneous effect of multiple reference points. Levin et al. (1998) suggest two distinct 
framing effects arise from the prospect theory value function: risky choice framing and 
goal framing.5 Examples of these two framing effects are presented in Table 2.1.  
Risky choice framing was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), and the 
typical risky choice framing task involves a choice between a sure option and a risky 
option (Keren 2011). As shown in Table 2.1 Panel A, risky choice frames are 
implemented by describing outcomes either as gains (i.e., providing increases in wealth) 
or losses (i.e., providing decreases in wealth) relative to a given reference point. Prior 
research suggests individuals will prefer the risky (sure) option when a decision is framed 
as a choice between a risky loss (gain) and a sure loss (gain), all else equal (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1984). For example, Schadewald (1989) examines risky choice frames in the 
context of tax refunds by asking individuals to choose between two options with the same 
expected value: a sure option of a $600 refund or a risky option of a $2,000 (no) refund 
with 30% (70%) probability. Schadewald (1989) finds individuals prefer the sure option 
                                                          
support of the concurrent influence of multiple reference points; however, the results of their experiment 
should also be interpreted with some caution as withholding position and expectations where not directly 
manipulated and the hypotheses were tested with a relatively small sample (i.e., responses from 44 
participants were used to draw inferences from an experiment with eight between subject conditions based 
on both measured and manipulated variables which are then fully crossed with four within subject 
conditions).  
5 Levin et al. (1998) also posit a third type of framing effect known as attribute framing. In attribute 
framing, a single attribute of a choice option is described in either positive (e.g., fair) or equivalent negative 
(e.g., unfair) terms (Teigen 2015). Positive frames are predicted to result in more favorable evaluations as 
they prime individuals to associate the positive attribute with the object of evaluation (Fatemi et al. 2008; 
Kuhberger 2017). For example, a project described as having a 50% chance of success will be evaluated 
more favorably than a project described as having a 50% chance of failure. While included in the typology 
by Levin et al. (1998), attribute framing is not discussed further in this manuscript as this framing effect is 
not predicated on prospect theory. 
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when outcomes are evaluated as gains relative to an expectation of receiving no refund 
rather than as losses relative to an expectation of receiving a $2,000 refund, but only 
when the refund that is more (less) than expected is explicitly labeled as a gain (loss). 
The process underlying risky choice framing is “a combination of (i) a shift of the 
reference point that determines whether outcomes are perceived as losses or gains, and 
(ii) prospect theory’s postulate of the value function, which is concave for gains and 
convex for losses” reflecting diminishing sensitivity (Keren 2011, 7). Reference points 
play a key role in risky choice framing as the description of a decision is assumed to 
influence the reference point from which outcomes are evaluated such that outcomes are 
either perceived as losses which will decrease wealth or as gains which will increase 
wealth (Kuhberger et al. 1999). For example, Table 2.1 Panel A illustrates how an 
outcome of receiving a $400 (option A) can be framed as a gain of $100 from the 
reference point of having $300 or as a loss of $100 from the reference point of having 
$500. Importantly, by changing the reference point from which the outcomes are 
evaluated, either option has the effect of making the decision maker better off in the gain 
frame while either option has the effect of making the decision maker worse off in the 
loss frame. 
Assuming individuals adopt the reference point inherent to a given frame, risky 
choice framing critically depends on the presence of diminishing sensitivity in the value 
function. For example, Figure 2.2 presents the change in subjective value of a 50-50 
chance of receiving a particular gain (loss) and the change in subjective value of 
receiving a sure gain (loss) of half the magnitude of the risky gain (loss). In Figure 2.2 
Panel A, the increase in subjective value from the sure gain is larger than the increase in 
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subjective value from the risky gain, resulting in a preference for the sure option in the 
gain domain. In contrast, the decrease in subjective value from the risky loss is smaller 
than the decrease in subjective value from the sure loss, resulting in a preference for the 
risky option in the loss domain. Similarly, the sure option in the gain (loss) risky choice 
frame example in Table 2.1 Panel A provides a larger increase (decrease) in subjective 
value than the risky option. Figure 2.2 also illustrates why risky choice framing effects 
are reliant on diminishing sensitivity rather than loss aversion. For a risky choice framing 
effect, differences in risk preferences can arise in the absence of loss aversion (Panel A), 
but are not present in the absence of diminishing sensitivity (Panel B).  
In contrast to a risky choice framing effect, Levin et al. (1998) indicate goal 
framing involves describing a choice such that the focus of the decision maker is directed 
either at the potential to avoid/reduce a loss (i.e., a loss frame) or preserve/increase a gain 
(i.e., a gain frame). For example, Krishen et al. (2014) find attitudes towards a new 
vehicle tax to support infrastructure are more positive when the tax is described as 
preventing a loss (i.e., the threat of deteriorating roads can be avoided) rather than 
preserving a gain (i.e., the ability to improve roads can be preserved). As highlighted in 
Table 2.1 Panel B, the point of goal framing is not necessarily to influence the reference 
point from which outcomes are evaluated. In this example, the perceived effect of making 
a donation is the same between frames because a decision maker’s wealth always 
decreases. Instead, goal frames influence how a situation is perceived such that a decision 
is either made within the context of an overarching gain or an overarching loss. By 
influencing how the situation is perceived, the goal or consequence of taking an action is 
framed as either preserving/increasing a gain or avoiding/reducing a loss (Keren 2011). 
16 
For example, a decision maker in the gain frame of Table 2.1 Panel B may perceive the 
effect of making a donation as reducing a gain while a decision maker in the loss frame 
may perceive the effect of making a donation as increasing a loss. 
 Goal framing effects occur as a result of loss aversion. Specifically, Levin et al. 
(1998) suggests that goal framing reflects a negativity bias. Negativity biases are rooted 
in the observation that individuals are more influenced by negative information than 
otherwise equivalent positive information (Kanoouse and Hanson 1972; Peeters and 
Czapinski 1990; Taylor 1991). Given the stronger effect of negative information relative 
to positive information, choices framed in terms of increasing a loss tend to be more 
motivating than choices framed in terms of reducing a gain (Kuhberger 2017). For 
example, the loss goal frame presented in Table 2.1 Panel B should be more aversive to 
donating because the same behavior is described as increasing a loss rather than 
decreasing a gain. While negativity biases are distinct from prospect theory, Levin et al. 
(1998, 177) note “A negativity bias has in fact been incorporated into prospect theory… 
This concept has been deemed ‘loss aversion’.”  
The relationship between goal frames and the prospect theory value function is 
illustrated in Figure 2.3, which shows the change in subjective value from an increase in 
a gain and a decrease in a loss of equal magnitude. As shown in Panel A, the increase in 
subjective value from decreasing a loss is larger than the increase in subjective value 
from increasing a gain. As a result, individuals tend to place greater value on the ability 
to reduce a loss than to increase a gain, and accordingly tend to be more willing to 
perform a given behavior when faced with a loss frame than a gain frame. Figure 2.3 also 
illustrates why goal framing effects are reliant on loss aversion rather than diminishing 
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sensitivity. For a goal framing effect, differences in risk preferences exist in the absence 
of diminishing sensitivity (Panel A), but do not exist in the absence of loss aversion 
(Panel B).  
Simultaneous and Interacting Framing Effects 
As previously discussed, the literature on individual taxpayer decisions suggests 
withholding positon and expectations may simultaneously frame an individual’s end of 
year tax position and influence their preferences in a risky tax decision. However, the 
literature on risky decision making has not explained how multiple reference points can 
account for the risk seeking and avoiding behaviors predicted by a value function which 
is specifically premised on the existence of a single reference point. To fill this gap in the 
literature, I posit that the typology of framing effects by Levin et al. (1998) provides an 
explanation for how withholding position and expectations can both frame an 
individual’s end of year tax position. Specifically, I predict withholding position 
influences decision through a goal framing effect while expectations influence decisions 
through a risky choice framing effect.  
 As previously discussed, goal framing influences decisions by framing the 
situation as either in a gain or loss domain, while risky choice framing influences 
decisions by framing the effect of taking an action as either a gain or a loss relative to a 
reference state. In the context of a risky tax decision, I hypothesize that withholding 
position frames the situation in which individuals make a risky tax decision. Prior 
research suggests individuals enjoy receiving a refund at the end of the year and are 
aversive to paying additional taxes (Ayers et al. 1999; Bobek et al. 2007). Moreover, 
prior research suggests an individual will perceive refunds as a gain and paying 
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additional taxes as a loss (Loftus 1985). When a taxpayer is due to receive a refund at the 
end of the year, any action which changes the amount of the refund will be perceived as 
affecting the amount of a gain. Conversely, when an individual owes additional taxes at 
the end of the year, any action which changes the amount of the tax due will be perceived 
as affecting the amount of a loss. Accordingly, I predict individuals will be more willing 
to take a risky tax deduction when they owe additional taxes than when they are due to 
receive a refund because loss aversion suggests individuals are more motivated to reduce 
a loss or stop it from getting larger than to maintain or increase the size of a gain. Further, 
I predict withholding positon influences decisions through a goal framing effect and will 
have the largest (smallest) effect on individuals who exhibit the largest (smallest) amount 
of loss aversion in their value function. Stated formally: 
H1: Withholding position influences decisions through a goal framing effect, and 
individuals who exhibit a greater (as compared to lesser) degree of loss aversion 
in their value function will react more strongly to withholding position framing 
effects. 
 
 In contrast to withholding position, I hypothesize that expectations frame the 
effect of taking an action as either a gain or a loss. Specifically, I predict tax positions are 
perceived as decreases in wealth if they provide outcomes which are worse than expected 
and as increases in wealth if they provide outcomes which are better than expected. For 
example, I predict individuals will evaluate the effect of taking a tax position which 
results in a $1,000 refund as increasing their wealth if they expected a $900 refund, but 
will perceive the effect of taking the same tax position as decreasing their wealth if they 
expected a $1,100 refund. Accordingly, I predict expectations influence decisions 
through a risky choice framing effect. Moreover, as risky choice framing effects are the 
result of diminishing sensitivity, I also predict expectations will have the largest 
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(smallest) effect on individuals who exhibit the largest (smallest) amount of diminishing 
sensitivity in their value function. Stated formally: 
H2: Expectations influence decisions through a risky choice framing effect, and 
individuals who exhibit a greater (as compared to lesser) degree of diminishing 
sensitivity in their value function will react more strongly to expectation framing 
effects. 
 
 Past studies that directly examine the concurrent role of withholding position and 
expectations provides mixed results (Schepanski and Shearer 1995; Copeland and Cuccia 
2002). However, other research indirectly suggests risky choice and goal framing effects 
can both operate at the same time. For example, prior research has shown risky choice 
framing effects can occur in decision scenarios involving gain (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981) or loss (e.g., Wang and Johnston 1995; Wang 
1996a) domains. If risky choice frames can arise in both gain and loss domains, 
expectations should also be able to frame decisions regardless of whether the 
expectations involve refunds or additional taxes. Similarly, other research indicates 
withholding position can frame decisions when outcomes result in final tax positions that 
are better than initially expected (e.g., deductions which decrease tax liability [Jackson 
and Hatfield 2005]) or worse than initially expected (e.g., reporting cash tip income 
which increases tax liability [Brink and Lee 2015]). Consequently, I predict withholding 
position and expectations can concurrently frame individual taxpayers’ decisions. Stated 
formally: 
H3: Withholding position framing effects and expectation framing effects can 
both concurrently influence preferences for a risky tax position. 
 
Although I predict risky choice and goal framing effects can occur simultaneously 
in the same decision scenario, other research suggests goal frames may interfere with the 
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process through which risky choice frames operate (Arkes et al. 2008). Specifically, 
results from Arkes et al. (2008) suggest individuals asymmetrically adapt reference 
points: references points tend to adapt more completely after experiencing a gain than a 
loss. As alluded to above, risky choice framing effects occur when individuals evaluate 
the effect of the same outcome from different reference points. Risky choice framing 
effects imply the description of an outcome can influence the reference point from which 
it is evaluated such that the decision is either cast as a choice between gains or a choice 
between losses (Kuhberger et al. 1999). If decision makers do not adopt the implied 
reference point, no framing effect should result. 
Prior research shows the way a situation is described can influence the reference 
point from which it is evaluated. For example, describing a cup as “half-empty” or “half-
full” influences the perceived referent state of the cup such that a cup described as “half-
empty” is more likely to suggest a reference point of a full cup (McKenzie and Nelson 
2003). However, research by Arkes et al. (2008) suggests individuals may resist adapting 
their reference point when doing so involves a loss. Specifically, Arkes et al. (2008) 
argue that adopting a new reference point entails recognizing a gain or loss in a mental 
account. Recognizing a gain (i.e., closing an account in the “black”) generates 
gratification while recognizing a loss (i.e., closing an account in the “red”) produces 
misery (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). Subsequent research provides additional support 
for the finding that reference points more readily adapt after gains than after losses 
(Arkes et al. 2010; Baucells et al. 2011; Bernasconi et al. 2014; Hack and von Bieberstein 
2015; Austin, Bobek, and LaMothe 2019).  
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Within the context of risky tax decisions, adopting the reference point implicit to 
expectations involving additional taxes due involves recognizing a loss as paying 
additional taxes is typically viewed as undesirable (Ayers et al. 1999; Bobek et al. 2007). 
Individuals may therefore resist adopting a reference point of owing additional taxes and 
no framing effect will occur. In contrast, individuals should have little trouble adopting 
the reference point implicit to expectations involving a tax refund because they should 
not be averse to recognizing a gain. Accordingly, I predict expectations involving tax 
refunds will influence decisions to a greater extent than expectations involving additional 
taxes due. Stated formally: 
H4: Expectations will have a greater impact on the preference for a risky tax 
position (i.e., a risky choice framing effect) when the expectations involve tax 
refunds (i.e., a gain goal frame) than when expectations involve additional taxes 
due (i.e., a loss goal frame). 
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Table 2.1 Examples of Risky Choice and Goal Frames  
 
Panel A: Example of Gain and Loss Risky Choice Frames 
Gain Risky Choice Frame Loss Risky Choice Frame 
Imagine yourself richer by $300 than 
you are today. Now choose between the 
following options: 
A) A sure gain of $100 
B) A 50% chance to gain $200 and a 
50% chance to gain nothing  
Imagine yourself richer by $500 than 
you are today. Now choose between 
the following options: 
A) A sure loss of $100 
B) A 50% chance to lose $200 and a 
50% chance to lose nothing 
Panel A provides an example of gain and loss risky choice frames based on problems 3 and 4 
from Tversky and Kahneman (1986). The final outcomes in terms of total wealth after choosing 
one of the options are identical in both frames: $400 if Option A is taken and either $300 or $500 
if Option B is taken. However, in the gain frame, decision makers are implicitly given a reference 
point of currently having $300 and the outcomes are therefore described in terms of an increase in 
wealth (i.e., a choice between gains). In the loss frame, decision makers are implicitly given a 
reference point of $500 and the outcomes are described in terms of a decrease in wealth (i.e., a 
choice between losses). Diminishing sensitivity suggests Option B, will be perceived as providing 
a smaller gain than Option A in the gain frame and a smaller loss than Option A in the loss frame. 
Accordingly, decision makers should prefer the safe option in the gain frame and the risky option 
in the loss frame. 
 
Panel B: Example of Gain and Loss Goal Frames 
Gain Goal Frame Loss Goal Frame 
Imagine you found $300 this morning 
and now have $500 in your wallet. Now 
choose between the following options: 
A) Donate $100 to a local charity 
B) Donate nothing to a local charity 
Imagine you lost $300 this morning 
and now have $500 in your wallet. 
Now choose between the following 
options: 
A) Donate $100 to a local charity 
B) Donate nothing to a local charity 
Panel B provides an example of gain and loss goal frames. The final outcomes in terms of total 
wealth after choosing one of the options are identical in both frames: $400 if Option A is taken 
and $500 if Option B is taken. However, previously finding $300 frames the situation such that 
the decision to donate is framed as a potential to reduce a gain while previously losing $300 
frames the situation such that the decision to donate is framed as a potential to increase a loss. 
Loss aversion suggests parting with the $100 will be more psychologically painful when doing so 
is perceived as increasing a loss than when described as decreasing a gain. Accordingly, decision 










































Figure 2.1 This figure highlights the fact that the prospect theory value function, as it is 
typically depicted, is the result of the concurrent existence of both diminishing sensitivity 
and loss aversion. The vertical axis of the value function is subjective value (i.e., utility) 
and the horizontal axis are outcomes (gains [to the right of the vertical axis] and losses [to 
the left of the vertical axis]).  














Panel A: Diminishing Sensitivity  
but No Loss Aversion
 




Figure 2.2 This figure illustrates the relationship between the prospect theory value 
function and risky choice framing effects involving a choice between a 50-50 chance of 
receiving/losing some given value or nothing otherwise (risky option), and 
receiving/losing half of that value with certainty (sure option). In both panels, “Risky” 
represents the subjective value of the risky option (ignoring the prospect theory decision 
weighting function, for the sake of simplicity) and “Sure” represents the subjective value 
of the certain option. Panel A illustrates how risky choice framing effects are perceived 
with a hypothetical value function which only exhibits diminishing sensitivity. In Panel 
A, the sure option provides a larger increase in subjective value than the risky option in 
the gain frame, but the risky option provides a smaller decrease in subjective value than 
the sure option in the loss frame. Accordingly, individuals tend to prefer the sure option 
in the gain frame and the risky option in the loss frame. Panel B illustrates how risky 
choice framing effects are perceived with a hypothetical value function which only 
exhibits loss aversion. Importantly, the pattern of preferences present in Panel A 
disappears in the absence of diminishing sensitivity, highlighting the reliance of risky 
choice framing effects on diminishing sensitivity (and not loss aversion) as a theoretical 
mechanism.   
Sure and Risky 
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Panel A: Loss Aversion but No  
Diminishing Sensitivity  
 
 
Panel B: Diminishing Sensitivity  
but No Loss Aversion 
 
 
Figure 2.3 This figure illustrates the relationship between the prospect theory value 
function and goal framing effects. Panel A illustrates how goal framing effects are 
perceived with a hypothetical value function which only exhibits loss aversion. In both 
panels, “Increased Gain” represents the increase in subjective value resulting from an 
outcome which is perceived as having a consequence (i.e., goal) of increasing a gain 
while “Decreased Loss” represents the increase in subjective value resulting from an 
outcome which is perceived as having a consequence of decreasing a loss. In Panel A, the 
increase in subjective value from a decreased loss is clearly larger than the increase in 
subjective value from an increased gain. Accordingly, individuals are more willing to 
take an action which is perceived as decreasing a loss than increasing a gain. Panel B 
illustrates how goal framing effects are perceived with a hypothetical value function 
which only exhibits diminishing sensitivity. Importantly, there is no difference in 
subjective value between increasing a gain and decreasing a loss in Panel B, thus 
highlighting the reliance of goal framing effects on loss aversion (and not diminishing 














To test the hypotheses, I conducted a 2x2 between-participant experiment in 
which taxpayers recruited from MTurk made a decision about a risky tax deduction.6 
Prior to responding to the primary experimental scenario, I measure the extent to which 
each participant’s value function exhibits diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. Then, 
after making a decision about the risky deduction, participants respond to manipulation 
and attention check items, as well as demographic and control items. At the conclusion of 
the experiment, participants are paid a flat fee of $1 and a bonus based on their decisions. 
The bonus is only paid if participants correctly respond to manipulation and attention 
check items, and participants are only informed of the amount of their bonus at the 
conclusion of the experiment.  
Diminishing Sensitivity and Loss Aversion Process Measures 
Prior to responding to the scenario, I measure the extent to which loss aversion 
(LOSSAVERSE) and diminishing sensitivity (SENSITIVITY) are present in each 
participant’s value function. These measures are used to test the first two hypotheses and 
are solicited using a process adapted from Holt and Laury (2002). For each measure, 
participants are presented with a series of ten choice sets for which they must choose 
                                                          
6 Participants are required to have completed at least 1,000 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) on MTurk 
with a 95% approval rating to access the link to the instrument. These criteria, along with attention check 
questions, are intended to ensure participants are attentive for the duration of the experiment. Prior research 
suggests these criteria are sufficient to attract and induce attentive MTurk workers, as high HIT rejection 
rates bear greater reputational costs to MTurk workers (Peer et al. 2013). 
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between two gambles. For each series of choices, one choice set is selected at random 
and the participant’s chosen bet is incorporated into their bonus. In all ten choice sets, 
Option B presents the same gamble, but the gamble in Option A changes as participants 
move through the choice sets. The choice sets are designed such that one option (e.g., 
Option B) initially dominates the other option (e.g., Option A). However, as participants 
move through the choice sets, the option which was initially dominated becomes 
increasingly attractive. Importantly, the point at which participants switch depends on the 
degree of diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion present in each participant’s value 
function.  
 Similar to the process used by Brink and Rankin (2013), I separately measure 
diminishing sensitivity in both the gain and loss domain.7 The measures are identical 
except for the domain of the outcomes in the choice sets (see Appendix 1, Panels A and 
B), thus, I will use the measure of SENSITIVITY in the gain domain to illustrate how the 
measure is collected. As shown in Panel A of Appendix 1, Option B for SENSITIVITY in 
the gain domain always provides a 50-50 chance of winning $700 or $800 and Option A 
provides a 50-50 chance of winning $0 or an increasing amount ranging from $1,500 to 
$2,400. Both options initially provide the same expected value, so participants should 
prefer Option B as it is less risky. However, as the possible gain gets larger, participants 
should increasingly prefer Option A. The point at which a participant switch will depend 
on the extent to which the value function exhibits diminishing sensitivity. A participant 
                                                          
7 The prospect theory value function is typically illustrated with a single term to represent diminishing 
sensitivity in both the gain and loss domains (e.g., Barberis 2013). However, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) use different terms to represent diminishing sensitivity: one in the gain domain and another in the 
loss domain. Accordingly, I solicit SENSITIVITY in both gain and loss domains, and use the average of 
these two measures in the analysis. The order in which participants see the two SENSITIVITY measures is 
counterbalanced, but all participants respond to the LOSSAVERSE measure in between responding to the 
two SENSITIVITY measures. 
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with more diminishing sensitivity in the value function will continue to choose Option B 
longer than a participant with less diminishing sensitivity. Accordingly, SENSITIVITY in 
the gain domain is computed as the number of times Option B is chosen. For 
SENSITIVITY in the loss domain, individuals should initially prefer Option A and a 
participant with more diminishing sensitivity in the value function will continue to 
choose Option A longer than a participant with less diminishing sensitivity. Accordingly, 
SENSITIVITY in the loss domain is computed as the number of times Option A is chosen. 
As illustrated in Appendix 2 Panel A, Option B for LOSSAVERSE always 
provides a 50-50 chance of either winning or losing $600; and Option A provides a 50-50 
chance of winning $2,000 or losing a decreasing amount ranging from $2,000 to $850. 
Both options initially provide the same expected value, so participants should initially 
prefer Option B as it offers a smaller possible loss. However, as the possible loss 
decreases, participants should increasingly prefer Option A. The point at which 
participants switch between options will depend on the extent to which the value function 
exhibits loss aversion. A participant with more loss aversion in the value function will 
continue to choose Option B longer than a participant with less loss aversion. 
Accordingly, LOSSAVERSE is computed as the number of times Option B is chosen.  
Experimental Scenario, Manipulations, and Dependent Variable 
The experimental scenario, manipulations, and dependent variable are reproduced 
in Appendix 3. After completing the LOSSAVERSE and SENSITIVITY measures, 
participants read background information about the hypothetical scenario and are told to 
assume they are preparing their federal income tax return using free tax software. 
Participants are told they have almost finished preparing their tax return, but must decide 
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how to deal with expenses related to a side business before finalizing the return. 
Participants are told they incurred a total of $6,000 in business expenses, but do not have 
documentation (e.g., receipts/proof of payment) for $2,000. Participants are informed 
deducting the undocumented expenses is generally preferable as doing so will reduce 
their tax liability. However, 25% of returns are audited and participants are informed the 
IRS will disallow any deduction for the undocumented portion of the expenses and assess 
a penalty for late payment of taxes upon audit. Importantly, participants are informed 
deducting the undocumented expenses is inherently risky, but not necessarily unethical as 
the expenses really did exist. Finally, participants are given specific information about the 
implications of the decision to deduct the undocumented expenses and are asked to make 
a decision regarding the business expenses.  
 The manipulations and the relationship between conditions and frames are 
summarized in Table 3.1. To implement the expectations framing manipulation, 
EXPECT, I manipulate the amount of business expenses initially included on the return.8 
Participants are told they initially estimated their business expenses while preparing the 
tax return and anticipated changing the amount of expenses after consulting their records. 
In the OVERESTIMATE (UNDERESTIMATE) condition, participants are told they 
estimated $7,000 ($1,000) of expenses. Accordingly, participants in the 
OVERESTIMATE condition are led to expect a tax refund (due) which is more (less) 
than the possible final outcomes and participants in the UNDERESTIMATE condition 
                                                          
8 Copeland and Cuccia (2002) suggest prior research may have failed to validate the role of expectations 
because experimentally assigned expectations may not be particularly salient. In the current study, I do not 
use expectations from prior years (all participants are informed that they either received a small refund or 
owed a small amount additional taxes in the past) but instead create expectations based on the results of an 
initially (though incompletely) prepared tax return, which allows me to saliently manipulate both 
expectations and withholding position.  
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are lead to expect a tax refund (due) which is less (more) than the possible final 
outcomes. To implement the withholding position framing manipulation, WITHHOLD, I 
alter the amount of each participant’s interim tax withholdings while holding overall tax 
liability constant. Participants in the REFUND (TAXDUE) condition are informed their 
tentatively prepared tax return results in a refund (owing additional taxes).  However, the 
amount of the refund/due depends on EXPECT to account for tax savings from initially 
overestimating/underestimating the amount of the deduction for business expenses. 
 After reading the background information as well as specific information about 
the implications of their decision, participants are presented with a summary of their 
options and the associated outcomes and probabilities. Participants then indicate which 
option they prefer: Option A (only deduct the documented expense) or Option B (deduct 
all $6,000 of the expenses). Specifically, the dependent variable (CHOICE) is measured 
on a 10-point Likert-type scale (i.e., a forced choice because there is no midpoint) 
anchored by “Definitely Option A” and “Definitely Option B” on opposite ends. 
Responses are coded such that a higher value of CHOICE indicates a greater preference 
for taking the risky deduction (i.e., deducting the undocumented expenses).  
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Table 3.1 Experiment Summary 
 
Relationship Between Conditions 
and Frames 














OVERESTIMATE REFUND  $7,600 $1,500 $900 
$1,300  
or $500 
OVERESTIMATE TAXDUE  $5,800 ($300) ($900) 
($500) or 
($1,300)  
UNDERESTIMATE REFUND  $7,600 $300 $900 
$1,300  
or $500 
UNDERESTIMATE TAXDUE  $5,800 ($1,500) ($900) 
($500) or 
($1,300)  
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the manipulations. All participants, irrespective of condition, 
face a final tax liability of $6,700 if they only deduct the documented portion of the business 
expenses and a final tax liability of $6,300 if they deduct all of the business expenses. 
However, there is a 25% chance the final tax liability could increase by $800 to $7,100 
(including a penalty for late payment of taxes) if participants deduct all of the business 
expenses because the IRS could subsequently disallow the deduction of the undocumented 
portion. Accordingly, final tax liability is held constant across all conditions given a decision to 
deduct or not deduct the undocumented business expenses, and the manipulations serve to 






Participants and Descriptive Statistics 
 A total of 700 participants were solicited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk).9 Of the sample, 92 participants failed to correctly respond to one or both 
manipulation checks, or the attention check question.10 Removing these participants does 
not influence the inferences drawn from the data, so they are retained in the sample. 
Compared to the US population, Table 4.1 Panel A indicates the sample is relatively 
young, with a median age range of 35 to 44 years old, and well educated, with 64% of 
participants having a college degree. Table 4.1 Panel B provides additional descriptive 
information about the sample. Notably, participants on average are relatively risk averse 
(p < 0.001, untabulated).11 Table 4.1 Panel C provides descriptive statistics for 
                                                          
9 Institutional review board approval was given prior to the collection of data. An additional 566 potential 
participants who clicked the link to the study were not allowed to participant. Of these potential 
participants, 310 individuals were screened out due to self-reports indicating they were not US citizens or 
residents, were under the age of 25, or did not have experience filing at least three previous US federal 
income tax returns. The remaining 256 potential participants were screened out (after having successfully 
met the previous screening criteria) for failing to correctly respond to a custom human intelligence 
question. Specifically, potential participants were presented with a 4x4 grid of single digit number between 
0 and 9 (inclusive) and were asked to select all of the even numbers on the outside edge of the grid. This 
question was designed to screen out either “bots” (i.e., non-human respondents) or individuals without 
sufficient understanding of the English language to interpret the question.  
10 For the manipulation check questions, participants were required to indicate whether they were initially 
due a tax refund or owed additional taxes and whether they initially deducted $1,000 or $7,000 of business 
expenses. For the attention check question, participants were required to respond to the following question: 
For quality control purposes, please select "somewhat agree" for this question to indicate that you are 
paying attention. 
11 All reported p-values are two tailed unless otherwise indicated. 
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SENSITIVITY and LOSSAVERSE.12 As discussed above and in Appendix 1, 
SENSITIVITY is the average of each participant’s responses to a series of gambles 
involving gains and a series of gambles involving losses. Results of an untabulated paired 
sample t-test indicate participants’ preferences for gambles differed between domains (p 
< 0.001). Untabulated results also indicate the process measures did not differ between 
experimental conditions (p > 0.100).  
Hypothesis Testing 
 As ANOVA analysis assumes parallel trends between categorical variables (i.e., 
no interactions between categorical and ordinal variables [Field 2013]), the first two 
hypotheses are tested using regressions rather than an ANOVA, as shown in Table 4.2 
Panel A. In all of these regressions, the dependent variable is CHOICE.13 For tests of H1 
(H2), the independent variables are WITHHOLD (EXPECT), LOSSAVERSE, and 
SENSITIVITY, as well as the interactions between the manipulation and the process 
measures. Similar to an ANOVA, I use effect coding for WITHHOLD and EXPECT (i.e., 
variables are coded as 1 or -1) rather than dummy coded indicator variables (i.e., 
variables are coded as 1 or 0). Importantly, using effect coding for the indicator variables 
                                                          
12 To ensure participants’ responses to the process measures reflected their true underlying preferences, I 
randomly selected three choice sets from each of the process measures and presented these choice sets to 
participants in a random order at the conclusion of the experiment (immediately prior to revealing their 
bonus). If responses to the process measures reflect participants’ true preferences, their responses should be 
consistent over time. While only one participant responded with the same choice for all nine choice sets, 
responses collected at the end of the experiment were highly correlated (ρ > 0.40, p < 0.001, untabulated) 
with the original collection of the items. 
13 As CHOICE is measured on a scale with no midpoint, participants were forced to indicate a preference 
for taking the risky deduction (i.e., deducting the undocumented business expenses) or taking the safe 
deduction (i.e., not deduction the undocumented business expenses) allowing me to create a dichotomized 
version of the dependent variable. Untabulated results indicate hypothesis testing is inferentially similar 
when this dichotomized version of CHOICE is used as the dependent variable. 
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allows the coefficients for the interactions between the indicator variables and the process 
measures to be interpreted as changes in the difference between the conditions. 
 H1 predicts withholding position influences decisions through a goal framing 
effect and will be moderated by loss aversion such that withholding position has the 
greatest effect when an individual’s value function exhibits a high, as compared to low, 
amount of loss aversion. Column 1 in Table 4.2 Panel A provides initial results of the test 
of H1 and indicates no significant interaction effect between WITHHOLD and 
LOSSAVERSE (p > 0.100). However, I examine the robustness of this result by removing 
participants with extreme values of LOSSAVERSE. These 274 participants chose the same 
gamble for each row in the LOSSAVERSE measure and may not have been paying 
attention, or may not have understood they were being asked to evaluate each gamble 
independently. Importantly, removing these observations should bias against finding 
results as the greatest difference in the effect of WITHHOLD should be between 
individuals with the highest and lowest values of LOSSAVERSE. Regression results based 
on this subsample in column 2 indicate a significant interaction between WITHHOLD and 
LOSSAVERSE (p = 0.029, one tailed) and no interaction between WITHHOLD and 
SENSITIVITY (p = 0.251).  
Least square means estimated at the lowest (1) and highest (9) values for 
LOSSAVERSE based on the regression in column 2 of Table 4.2 Panel A are presented in 
Figure 4.1, and illustrate the effect of loss aversion on withholding position framing 
effects. Moreover, supplemental tests in Table 4.2 Panel B show WITHHOLD has no 
effect when LOSSAVERSE is low (p = 0.398, one tailed) but WITHHOLD has a 
significant effect when LOSSAVERSE is high (p = 0.021, one tailed). The results in 
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column 2 of Table 4.2, compared to column 1, suggest the participants responding with 
extreme values of LOSSAVERSE may not have been paying attention, and the lack of 
results in column 1 may have resulted from noise created by these participants. Overall, 
the results provide evidence in support of H1 and suggest withholding position influences 
decisions through a goal framing effect, and occurs due to loss aversion. 
H2 predicts expectations influence decisions through a risky choice framing effect 
and will be moderated by diminishing sensitivity such that expectations have the greatest 
effect when an individual’s value function exhibits a high, compared to low, level of 
diminishing sensitivity. Column 3 of Table 4.2 Panel A provides initial results of the tests 
of H2 and reveal no significant interaction effect between EXPECT and SENSITIVITY (p 
> 0.100). However, similar to the tests of H1, I examine the robustness of this result by 
removing participants with the most extreme values of SENSITIVITY. As before, 
removing these 129 observations should bias against finding results as the greatest 
difference in the effect of EXPECT should be between individuals with the highest and 
lowest values of SENSITIVITY. Consistent with H2, regression results from this 
subsample, column 4, indicate a marginally significant interaction between EXPECT and 
SENSITIVITY (p = 0.061, one tailed) and no EXPECT and LOSSAVERSE interaction (p = 
0.743).  
Least square means estimated at the lowest (0.5) and highest (9.5) values for 
SENSITIVITY based on the regression in column 4 of Table 4.2 Panel A are presented in 
Figure 4.2, and illustrate the effect of diminishing sensitivity on expectation framing 
effects. Moreover, supplemental tests in Table 4.2 Panel C show EXPECT has no effect 
when SENSITIVITY is low (p = 0.881) but EXPECT has a significant effect when 
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SENSITIVITY is high (p = 0.006, one tailed). The results in column 4 of Table 4.2, 
compared to column 3, suggest participants responding with extreme values of 
SENSITIVITY may not have been paying attention, and the lack of results in column 1 
may have resulted from noise created by these participants. The results provide evidence 
in support of H2 and suggest expectations influence decisions through risky choice 
framing which occurs due to diminishing sensitivity.  
 H3 predicts expectation framing effects and withholding position framing effects 
can simultaneously exist and concurrently influence individuals’ risky tax decisions. The 
pattern of means shown in Table 4.3 Panel A and displayed graphically in Figure 4.3 
provides initial evidence consistent with H3. Specifically, the column (row) means 
suggest participants in the TAXDUE (OVERESTIMATE) conditions have a greater 
preference for the risky deduction than those in the REFUND (UNDERESTIMATE) 
conditions. Using the ANOVA displayed in Table 4.3 Panel B, I find significant main 
effects for both EXPECT (p = 0.001) and WITHHOLD (p = 0.017). These results are 
consistent with H3 and confirm the findings of Copeland and Cuccia (2002).  
H4 predicts an interaction between expectation framing effects and withholding 
framing effects such that expectation framing effects will be more prominent when 
expectations involve tax refunds than when they involve additional taxes due. However, 
as shown in Table 4.3 Panel B, I do not find any interaction between EXPECT and 
WITHHOLD (p > 0.100). Upon reflection, I believe one possible reason for this lack of 
significance could be the strength with which expectations were presented. Specifically, 
participants were told their expected tax refund or due prior to being told about the risky 
tax deduction. Prior research suggests individuals may adopt a new reference point more 
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quickly or completely in the absence of a reason to delay adopting the new reference 
point (Austin, Bobek, and LaMothe 2019). Moreover, prior research suggests individual 
taxpayers have little domain specific expertise related to taxation and therefore are often 
willing to quickly accept tax advice from perceived authorities even if doing so overstates 
tax liability (Masselli et al. 2002). Thus, while the results of my experiment do not 
provide evidence of an interaction effect, it is possible an interaction effect could arise if 
expectations and withholding position are presented at the same time as the risky 
decision. 
Robustness Checks 
 To ensure the robustness of my results, I examine the influence of a number of 
demographic and control items. Of the items reported in Table 4.1, untabulated analyses 
indicates only perceived detection rate differs significantly across conditions (p < 0.100). 
This variable is not a significant predictor of the dependent variable, and inferences from 
tests of the hypotheses are unchanged when it is included in the analyses. A number of 
demographic and control items, including perceived fairness, personal norms towards tax 
compliance, and preferences for taking risks are significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable. Moreover, the dependent variable also differs across gender, age, 
preparation method. However, only personal norms and risk taking are consistently 
significant in the models used to test the hypotheses. When personal norms and risk 
taking are included, inferences from hypothesis testing are unchanged with one notable 
exception related to H2. Specifically, when these variables are included in the regression 
in column 4 in Table 4.2 Panel A, the interaction between EXPECT and SENSITIVITY 
becomes insignificant (p > 0.100, one tailed).  
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Table 4.1 Sample Demographics and Descriptive Statistics 
 






Gender   
Male 49% 49% 
Female 51% 51% 
Age   
25 to 34 39% 20% 
35 to 44 28% 19% 
45 to 54 19% 20% 
55 to 59 7% 10% 
60 or older 8% 31% 
Education   
Less than high school 1% 13% 
High school 10% 27% 
Some college courses 26% 21% 
College graduate 51% 27% 
Post-graduate degree or courses 13% 12% 
Income   
Less than $25,000 17% 21% 
$25,000 to $49,999 29% 23% 
$50,000 to $74,999 26% 18% 
$75,000 to $99,999 14% 12% 
$100,000 or more 13% 26% 
Prefer not to respond 2% - 
Prior Year Tax Return   
Self-prepared by hand 10% - 
Self-prepared with software  65% - 
Prepared by friend/family 7% - 
Prepared by tax professional 18% - 
Did not file in prior year <1% - 
Gender, age, education, and household income are from the US Census 
Bureau 2017 estimates (factfinder.census.gov). Age and education data is 
based on the population over age 25. 
  
39 
Panel B. Individual Characteristic Variables (n=700) 
Variables Mean S.D. 
Perceived Audit Rate 14.91% 16.08% 
Perceived Detection Rate 58.9% 32.72% 
Perceived Fairness 4.91 1.14 
Personal Norms 5.69 1.48 
Risk Preferences 2.97 1.64 
Panel B displays means and standard deviations for individual characteristic variables. 
Perceived audit rate and perceived detection rate are recorded on a scale ranging from 0% 
to 100%. Perceived fairness, personal norms, and risk preferences are measured on 7-point 
Likert scales and are coded such that higher values indicate a perception that taxes are 
fairer, greater personal norms towards compliance, and a greater preference for risks, 
respectively. Perceived audit rate, perceived detection rate, and perceived fairness in Panel 
B refer to perceptions about the US tax system. 
 
Panel C. Process Measures (n=700) 
Variables Mean S.D. 
Diminishing Sensitivity for Gains 7.52 3.15 
Diminishing Sensitivity for Losses 5.11 3.76 
SENSITIVITY 6.32 2.45 
LOSSAVERSE 4.68 3.68 
Panel C displays means and standard deviations for the process measures. SENSITIVITY is 
the average of the measure for diminishing sensitivity in the gain and loss domains. 
Variables are coded such that higher values indicate a greater amount of diminishing 
sensitivity or loss aversion (values range from a low of 0 to a high of 10). Additional 
information about SENSITIVITY can be found in Appendix 1 and additional information 




Table 4.2 Tests of H1 and H2 
 
Panel A: Coefficients [t-statistics] for Regressions used to test H1 and H2 
 Tests of H1  Tests of H2 











































   








Observations 700 426  700 571 
Panel A displays the results from the regressions used to test H1 and H2. For each regression, the 
dependent variable is CHOICE (see Table 4.1, Panel D) which is coded such that higher values 
indicate a greater preference for the risky option. Regression 1 (3) displays the results for H1 (H2) 
using the entire sample. Regression 2 displays results for H1 using a reduced sample wherein 
participants with the most extreme values of LOSSAVERSE are removed. Similarly, regression 4 
displays results for H2 using a reduced sample wherein participants with the most extreme values 
for SENSITIVITY are removed. 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. P-values for 
hypothesized effects are one tailed, except where directionally inconsistent with the hypothesis. 
 
Panel B: Simple Effect of WITHHOLD at High and Low Levels of LOSSAVERSE 
Test Difference df t-statistic p-value 
Effect when LOSSAVERSE is low (1)  0.27 1 0.26 0.398 
Effect when LOSSAVERSE is high (9) 2.38 1 2.03 0.021 
Panel B displays the results of planned contrasts based, on regression 2 in Panel A, to examine the 
simple effect of WITHHOLD when LOSSAVERSE is at the lowest (1) and highest (9) possible value. P-






Panel C: Simple Effect of EXPECT at High and Low Levels of SENSITIVITY 
Test Difference df t-statistic p-value 
Effect when SENSITIVITY is low (0.5)  -0.14 1 -0.18 0.881 
Effect when SENSITIVITY is high (9.5) 2.08 1 2.52 0.006 
Panel C displays the results of planned contrasts, based on regression 4 in Panel A, to examine the 
simple effect of EXPECT when SENSITIVITY is at the lowest (0.5) and highest (9.5) possible value. P-




Table 4.3 Tests of H3 and H4 
 
Panel A. Means [Standard Deviations] for CHOICE by Condition 
 WITHHOLD  














n = 179 
5.55 
[3.72] 
n = 172 
5.06 
[3.63] 




n = 351 
4.94 
[3.69] 
n = 349 
 
Panel A displays means [standard deviations] for the dependent variable (CHOICE) by 
condition. Specifically, participants were asked “Given the circumstances, would you rather 
deduct the $4,000 of documented expenses (Option A) or all $6,000 of the expenses (Option 
B)?” Responses are collected on a 10-point Likert-type scale and are coded such that higher 
values indicate a greater preference for the risky option. As the scale has no mid-point, 
participants are effectively required to choose between Option A or Option B. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Tests of H3 and H4 
Source df Mean Square F-statistic p-value 
EXPECT 1 140.72 10.99 0.001 
WITHHOLD 1 73.80 5.76 0.017 
EXPECT*WITHHOLD 1 15.66 1.22 0.269 
ERROR 696 12.81   
Panel B displays the results from an ANOVA in which the dependent variable is the CHOICE, 
which is each participant’s indicated preference for deducting only the documented portion of 
business expenses (i.e., the safe option) or all business expenses including $2,000 of 
undocumented expenses (i.e., the risky option). CHOICE is measured on a 10-point Likert-type 
scale with higher values indicating a greater preference for the risky option. The independent 
factors include EXPECT, which indicates whether participants were led to expect their refund 
(amount due) to be to be lower (higher) than all possible final outcomes or higher (lower) than all 
possible final outcomes, and WITHHOLD, which indicates whether participants were placed in a 






Figure 4.1 This figure presents the least square means for CHOICE at the lowest (1) and 
highest (9) levels of LOSSAVERSE based on the regression presented in column 2 of 
Table 4.2 Panel A. CHOICE is measured in response to the following question: “Given 
the circumstances, would you rather deduct the $4,000 of documented expenses (Option 
A) or all $6,000 of the expenses (Option B)?” Responses are collected on a 10-point 
Likert-type scale and are coded such that higher values indicate a greater preference for 
the risky option. LOSSAVERSE is discussed in greater detail in Appendix B. Consistent 
with H1, the difference between the REFUND and TAXDUE conditions are greatest 
when LOSSAVERSE is high as opposed to when LOSSAVERSE is low.  




























Figure 4.2 This figure presents the least square means for CHOICE at the lowest (0.5) 
and highest (9.5) levels of SENSITIVITY based on the regression presented in column 4 
of Table 4.2 Panel A. CHOICE is measured in response to the following question: “Given 
the circumstances, would you rather deduct the $4,000 of documented expenses (Option 
A) or all $6,000 of the expenses (Option B)?” Responses are collected on a 10-point 
Likert-type scale and are coded such that higher values indicate a greater preference for 
the risky option. SENSITIVITY is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A. Consistent 
with H2, the difference between the UNDERESTIMATE and OVERESTIMATE 
conditions are greatest when SENSITIVITY is high as opposed to when SENSITIVITY is 
low.  




























Figure 4.3 This figure presents the means for CHOICE by condition. CHOICE is 
measured in response to the following question: “Given the circumstances, would you 
rather deduct the $4,000 of documented expenses (Option A) or all $6,000 of the 
expenses (Option B)?” Responses are collected on a 10-point Likert-type scale and are 






























In this study, I examine the distinct effects of diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion in 
the prospect theory value function by providing experimental evidence that risky choice 
and goal framing effects can concurrently influence a single decision because they are 
driven by different theoretical processes. Specifically, in an experiment involving a risky 
tax decision, I show withholding position frames an individual’s end of year tax position 
through goal framing, which has a greater effect when an individual’s value function 
exhibits a greater amount of loss aversion. In contrast, I show expectations frame an 
individual’s end of year tax position through a risky choice framing effect, which has a 
greater effect when an individual’s value function exhibits a greater amount of 
diminishing sensitivity. Finally, I examine whether multiple framing effects can 
simultaneously influence an individual’s decisions, and whether these framing effects 
interact. Results from the experiment suggest both risky choice and goal framing effects 
can concurrently exist and influence decisions, but I do not find any evidence of an 
interaction. 
The results of this study are subject to some limitations. For example, I only 
examine a single tax scenario and therefore cannot definitively claim my results will 
generalize to other situations. Even so, the discussion of the theory behind risky choice 
and goal framing effects as well as the theoretical implications of the experiment should 
generalize to a multitude of settings both within and outside of the accounting context. I 
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leave validating the theoretical expectations in other settings to future research. In 
addition, I inform participants about the outcome of an incompletely prepared return to 
manipulate expectations. This approach allows me to saliently manipulate expectations, 
but somewhat differs from past studies which have used participants own prior year 
filings (Copeland and Cuccia 2002) and the advice of tax professionals (Schadewald 
1989; Schepanski and Shearer 1995) to manipulate expectations. Accordingly, my results 
may not generalize to the influence of other determinants of expectations.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, this study contributes to the 
literature on individual taxpayer decision making by providing an explanation for how 
withholding position and expectations can both concurrently frame risky tax decisions. 
This study provides evidence that the withholding phenomenon is driven by loss 
aversion. The mechanism underlying the withholding phenomenon has been implicitly 
debated in the tax compliance literature since it was first documented. Several studies 
focus on diminishing sensitivity and differences in risk preferences as the driver of the 
withholding phenomenon (e.g,, Schadewald 1989) while others focus on loss aversion 
(e.g., Carroll 1987; Austin, Bobek, and Jackson 2019). As policy makers look to curtail 
noncompliance, particularly among individuals who owe additional taxes, the results of 
this study suggest perceptions of losses are more influential than perceptions of risk. For 
example, the results suggest increasing penalties (i.e., losses from noncompliance) may 
be more influential than increasing audit rates. 
 In addition, the results of this study contribute theoretically to the literatures 
examining framing effects within the context of the typology provided by Levin et al. 
(1998). Specifically, the results of this study are the first to empirically validate the 
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mechanisms underlying risky choice and goal framing effects and provides insights 
which contradict more recent suggestions that these two framing effects rely on the same 
theoretical mechanism (e.g., Keren 2011). Moreover, the results from this study 
contribute to the very broad literature relying on prospect theory by highlighting how the 
two features which give rise to the shape of the value function, diminishing sensitivity 
and loss aversion, separately and concurrently influence decisions. As loss aversion and 
diminishing sensitivity are each capable of influencing behavior, researchers must work 
diligently to identify the specific mechanism which drives a hypothesized effect as these 
two mechanism can result in different predictions depending on how they are applied. In 
the instances in which loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity can each be used to make 
the same prediction, researchers must be careful to identify which mechanism underlies 
their hypotheses and which mechanism is an alternative explanation, as to clearly identify 
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Panel A. Choice Sets and Range Estimates of Diminishing Sensitivity for Gains 
Option A  Option B  Range Estimate for α if 
Option A is Chosena 
Panel C 
Region 50% 50%  50% 50%  
$0 $1,500  $700 $800  α > 1.00 1 
$0 $1,550  $700 $800  0.95 < α < 1.00 2 
$0 $1,600  $700 $800  0.91 < α < 0.95 3 
$0 $1,650  $700 $800  0.88 < α < 0.91 4 
$0 $1,700  $700 $800  0.85 < α < 0.88 5 
$0 $1,800  $700 $800  0.79 < α < 0.85 6 
$0 $1,900  $700 $800  0.75 < α < 0.79 7 
$0 $2,000  $700 $800  0.71 < α < 0.75 8 
$0 $2,200  $700 $800  0.64 < α < 0.71 9 
$0 $2,400  $700 $800  0.60 < α < 0.64 10 
Panel A provides an overview of the choice sets used to measure SENSITIVITY in the gain domain, 
as well as the implied values for diminishing sensitivity given a particular switching point. For each 
choice set, participants must indicate which gamble they prefer. The expected value of both options 
is equal in the first set, but individuals should prefer Option B unless their value function exhibits no 
diminishing in the gain domain. However, as the size of the possible gain in Option A increases, an 
individual’s value function must exhibit an increasing degree of diminishing sensitivity to forego 
switching to Option A. An individual whose value function exhibits a greater degree of diminishing 
sensitivity will continue to select Option B longer than an individual with less diminishing 
sensitivity. Accordingly, SENSITIVITY in the gain domain is measured as the absolute number of 
times an individual selects Option B.  
 
aThe estimates of diminishing sensitivity in the gain domain are based on the value function in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992): 
 
𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0
 
 
where 𝑥 is a dollar gain or loss, α is a term which represents diminishing sensitivity in the gain 
domain, β is a term which represents diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain, λ is a term which 
represents loss aversion. α, β, and λ are assumed to be positive. The estimates were also calculated 
on the assumption of the probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
An individual’s value function is concave in the gain domain when α is less than one because α is an 
exponential term. Accordingly, as α gets smaller, diminishing sensitivity increases. For any 
individual who selects Option B for all of the choice sets, α must be less than 0.6. The estimates of α 
are not used directly in the analysis, but are used to approximate and plot the shape of the value 






Panel B. Choice Sets and Estimates of Diminishing Sensitivity for Losses 
Option A  Option B  Range Estimate for β if 
Option B is Chosena 
Panel C 
Region 50% 50%  50% 50%  
$0 ($1,500)  ($700) ($800)  β > 1.00 11 
$0 ($1,550)  ($700) ($800)  0.95 < β < 1.00 12 
$0 ($1,600)  ($700) ($800)  0.91 < β < 0.95 13 
$0 ($1,650)  ($700) ($800)  0.88 < β < 0.91 14 
$0 ($1,700)  ($700) ($800)  0.85 < β < 0.88 15 
$0 ($1,800)  ($700) ($800)  0.79 < β < 0.85 16 
$0 ($1,900)  ($700) ($800)  0.75 < β < 0.79 17 
$0 ($2,000)  ($700) ($800)  0.71 < β < 0.75 18 
$0 ($2,200)  ($700) ($800)  0.64 < β < 0.71 19 
$0 ($2,400)  ($700) ($800)  0.60 < β < 0.64 20 
Panel B provides an overview of the choice sets used to measure SENSITIVITY in the loss 
domain, as well as the implied values for diminishing sensitivity given a particular switching 
point. Even though the gambles offered in the choice sets above all involve a choice between 
losses, these choice sets are intended to measure diminishing sensitivity rather than loss 
aversion. Loss aversion influences the evaluation of all of the outcomes in a similar manner, and 
therefore should not influence choices between options. For each choice set, participants must 
indicate which gamble they prefer. The expected value of both options is equal in the first choice 
set, but individuals should initially prefer Option A unless their value function exhibits no 
diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain. However, as the size of the possible loss in Option A 
increases, an individual’s value function must exhibit an increasing degree of diminishing 
sensitivity to forego switching to Option B. An individual whose value function exhibits a 
greater degree of diminishing sensitivity will continue to select Option A longer than an 
individual with less diminishing sensitivity. Accordingly, SENSITIVITY in the loss domain is 
measured as the absolute number of times and individuals selects Option A. 
 
aThe estimates of diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain are based on the value function in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992): 
 
𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0
 
 
where 𝑥 is a dollar gain or loss, α is a term which represents diminishing sensitivity in the gain 
domain, β is a term which represents diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain, λ is a term 
which represents loss aversion. α, β, and λ are assumed to be positive. The estimates were also 
calculated on the assumption of the probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). An individual’s value function is convex in the loss domain when β is less 
than one because β is an exponential term. Accordingly, as β gets smaller, diminishing 
sensitivity increases. For any individual who selects Option A for all of the choice sets, β must 
be less than 0.6. The estimates of β are not used directly in the analysis, but are used to 
approximate and plot the shape of the value function given an individual’s switching point from 





Panel C. Implied Extent of Diminishing Sensitivity in the Value Function 
 
 
Panel C provides a visual example of the differing levels of diminishing sensitivity which 
can be detected by SENSITIVITY. This figure uses a λ of 2.20 as it approximates the 
midpoint of the detectible levels of loss aversion from the LOSSAVERSE measure. Each 
of the numbers on the figure represent a region through which the value function will 
pass given a particular switching point between Option A and Option B, and corresponds 
to the regions indicated in Panel A or Panel B. 
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 Range Estimate for λ if Option A is 
Chosena 
50% 50%  50% 50%  
Low 
SENSITIVITY 
(α = β = 1.0) 
High 
SENSITIVITY 




($2,000) $2,000  ($600) $600  λ < 1.00 λ < 1.00 1 
($1,500) $2,000  ($600) $600  1.00 < λ < 1.56 1.00 < λ < 1.45 2 
($1,400) $2,000  ($600) $600  1.56 < λ < 1.75 1.45 < λ < 1.60 3 
($1,300) $2,000  ($600) $600  1.75 < λ < 2.00 1.60 < λ < 1.79 4 
($1,200) $2,000  ($600) $600  2.00 < λ < 2.33 1.79 < λ < 2.05 5 
($1,100) $2,000  ($600) $600  2.33 < λ < 2.80 2.05 < λ < 2.42 6 
($1,000) $2,000  ($600) $600  2.80 < λ < 3.50 2.42 < λ < 2.95 7 
($950) $2,000  ($600) $600  3.50 < λ < 4.00 2.95 < λ < 3.34 8 
($900) $2,000  ($600) $600  4.00 < λ < 4.67 3.34 < λ < 3.85 9 
($850) $2,000  ($600) $600  4.67 < λ < 5.60 3.85 < λ < 4.56 10 
Panel A provides an overview of the choice sets used to measure LOSSAVERSE as well as the implied 
values for loss aversion at high and low levels of SENSITIVITY given a particular switching point. For 
each choice set, participants must indicate which gamble they prefer. The expected value of both 
options is equal in the first set, but most individuals should prefer Option B as it guarantees a lower 
maximum amount of loss. However, as the size of the possible loss in Option A decreases, an 
individual’s value function must exhibit an increasing degree of loss aversion to forego switching to 
Option A. An individual whose value function exhibits a greater degree of loss aversion will continue 
to select Option B longer than an individual with less loss aversion. Accordingly, LOSSAVERSE is 
measured as the absolute number of times an individual selects Option B.  
 
aThe estimates of loss aversion are based on the value function in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), 
namely: 
𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0
 
where 𝑥 is a dollar gain or loss, α is a term which represents diminishing sensitivity in the gain domain, 
β is a term which represents diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain, λ is a term which represents loss 
aversion. α, β, and λ are assumed to be positive. The estimates were also calculated on the assumption 
of the probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). An individual’s 
value function is steeper in the loss domain than in the gain domain when λ is greater than 1 because λ 
is a scaling constant which is applied in the loss domain (i.e., when 𝑥 < 0). Accordingly, loss aversion 
is greater as λ is larger. For any individual who selects Option B for all of the choice sets, λ must be in 
excess of 5.6 (4.56) given an α = β of 1 (0.6). The estimates of λ are not used directly in the analysis, 
but are used to approximate and plot the shape of the value function given an individual’s switching 




Panel B. Implied Extent of Loss Aversion in the Value Function  
 
Panel B provides a visual example of the differing levels of loss aversion which can be 
detected by LOSSAVERSE given a relatively moderate level of SENSITIVITY (i.e., α = β 
= 0.79). This figure uses an α = β of 0.79 as it is the midpoint of the detectible levels of 
loss aversion from the SENSITIVITY measure. Each of the numbers in the lower left hand 
corner of the figure represent a region through which the value function will pass given a 
particular switching point between Option A and Option B, and corresponds to the 















EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO, MANIPULATIONS, AND 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Assume you are preparing your federal income tax return using a free tax preparation 
software. In the past, you have either owed a very small amount of additional tax or 
received a small very refund. After you prepare your tax return, the tax software indicates 
you will [receive a $1,500 refund/receive a $300 refund/owe $300 in additional 
taxes/owe $1,500 in additional taxes]. A summary of your tax return is provided below: 
 
OVERESTIMATE/REFUND 
Adjusted Gross Income  $   60,500  
Standard Deduction  $ (12,200)  
     Taxable Income  $   48,300  
Tax on Taxable Income  $     6,100  
Total Prepayments  $   (7,600)  
     Refund  $     1,500  
 
OVERESTIMATE/TAXDUE 
Adjusted Gross Income  $   60,500  
Standard Deduction  $ (12,200)  
     Taxable Income  $   48,300  
Tax on Taxable Income  $     6,100  
Total Prepayments  $   (5,800)  
    Additional Taxes Due  $        300 
 
UNDERESTIMATE/REFUND 
Adjusted Gross Income  $   66,500  
Standard Deduction  $ (12,200)  
     Taxable Income  $   54,300  
Tax on Taxable Income  $     7,300  
Total Prepayments  $   (7,600)  
     Refund  $        300  
 
UNDERESTIMATE/TAXDUE 
Adjusted Gross Income  $   66,500  
Standard Deduction  $ (12,200)  
     Taxable Income  $   54,300  
Tax on Taxable Income  $     7,300  
Total Prepayments  $   (5,800) 
    Additional Taxes Due  $     1,500 
 
 
Before you finalize your tax return, you must first decide how to deal with some expenses 
from a small side business. As you prepared your tax return, you could not remember 
exactly how much you spent on business expenses. However, you wanted to finish the 
rest of the return and entered [$7,000/$1,000] as an estimate of your expenses. At the 
time you entered the amount, you knew you would need to review your records to get a 
more accurate expense number. 
 
Your financial records, which you hand write in a spiral bound notebook, show a total of 
$6,000 in business expenses this year. However, when you look through your box of 
receipts, you realize that you do not have documentation for $2,000 of the expenses. 
Your supplier went out of business at the end of the year and you paid in cash, so there is 




While you would prefer to deduct all $6,000 of expenses, you only have proper 
documentation for $4,000. Deducting all $6,000 of expenses would not necessarily be 
unethical because you actually spent $6,000. However, if the IRS audits your tax return, 
the $2,000 of undocumented expenses would very likely be disallowed. If they are 
disallowed, you would pay the additional taxes as well as a penalty. 
 
OVERESTIMATE Conditions: 
As a reminder, your return currently shows you [are due to receive a $1,500 tax 
refund/owe $300 in additional taxes] on the assumption of having $7,000 in business 
expenses. If you deduct $4,000 of expenses (i.e., do not deduct the undocumented 
expenses), you will pay $600 more. In contrast, if you deduct all $6,000 of the business 
expenses, you will only pay $200 more. However, if you deduct all $6,000 of the 
expenses and your tax return is audited, you will pay $1,000 more because you will be 
required to pay $600 in additional taxes as well as $400 in penalties. You estimate there 
is a 25% chance the IRS will audit the return and disallow the deduction for any 
undocumented expenses included on the tax return. In summary, you have the following 
options: 
REFUND Condition: 
Option A: Deduct $4,000 of expenses 
There is a 100% chance your tax refund 
will decrease by $600. 
Option B: Deduct $6,000 of expenses 
There is a 75% chance your tax refund 
will decrease by $200 and a 25% chance 
your tax refund will decrease by $1,000. 
TAXDUE Condition: 
Option A: Deduct $4,000 of expenses 
There is a 100% chance the amount you 
owe will increase by $600. 
Option B: Deduct $6,000 of expenses 
There is a 75% chance the amount you 
owe will increase by $200 and a 25% 
chance the amount you owe will 





UNDERESTIMATE Conditions:  
As a reminder, your return currently shows you [are due to receive a $300 tax 
refund/owe $1,500 in additional taxes] on the assumption of having $1,000 in business 
expenses. If you deduct $4,000 of expenses (i.e., do not deduct the undocumented 
expenses), you will save $600. In contrast, if you deduct all $6,000 of the business 
expenses, you will save $1,000. However, if you deduct all $6,000 of the expenses and 
your tax return is audited, you will only save $200 as your tax savings will be reduced to 
$600 and will be further reduced by $400 in penalties. You estimate there is a 25% 
chance the IRS will audit the return and disallow the deduction for any undocumented 
expenses included on the tax return. In summary, you have the following options: 
 
REFUND Condition: 
Option A: Deduct $4,000 of expenses 
There is a 100% chance your tax 
refund will increase by $600. 
Option B: Deduct $6,000 of expenses 
There is a 75% chance your tax refund 
will increase by $1,000 and a 25% 
chance your tax refund will increase 
by $200. 
TAXDUE Condition: 
Option A: Deduct $4,000 of expenses 
There is a 100% chance the amount 
you owe will decrease by $600. 
Option B: Deduct $6,000 of expenses 
There is a 75% chance the amount you 
owe will decrease by $1,000 and a 25% 
chance the amount you owe will 
decrease by $200. 
 
Dependent Variable for All Conditions: 
Given the circumstances, would you rather deduct the $4,000 of documented expenses 
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